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A Vision Softly Creeping:
Congressional Acquiescence
and the Dormant Commerce Clause
A response to Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384 (2003).
Jim Chen
t
I. LAYING CRITICISM OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE TO REST
The Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, a
body of jurisprudence as deep as it is despised, provides the
strongest constitutional bulwark against hostile state regulation
and taxation of the national economy. Allowing the states to
"guard them[selves] against [interstate] competition" would re-
open "the door... to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be
averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power
of the nation."' Its many opponents characterize the dormant
Commerce Clause as the Voldemort of American constitutional
law, a dastardly doctrine with no basis in the text of the Consti-
tution. So numerous indeed are the doctrine's critics that credible
commentators can no longer be content merely to assert that the
dormant Commerce Clause lacks textual, structural, or historical
t James L. Krusemark Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School <chenx064@maroon.tc.umn.edu>. Daniel A. Farber, Philip P. Frickey,
Gil Grantmore, and David Stras provided helpful comments. Special thanks to
Kathleen Chen. This essay was presented on April 12, 2004, at the University
of Alabama School of Law, courtesy of that school's chapter of the Federalist
Society. I derive the title of this piece from SIMON & GARFUNKEL, The Sound
of Silence, on SOUNDS OF SILENCE (Columbia 1966) ("[A] vision softly creeping/
Left its seeds while I was sleeping").
1. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
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support . Writers seeking tenure or even law review credit must
dig deeper within American constitutional law's chamber of se-
crets.
Insofar as the Supreme Court remains free to disregard even
those legal positions which are "supported by all the law profes-
sors in the land,"3 Justices Scalia and Thomas stand far taller
than other critics of the dormant Commerce Clause. These Jus-
tices so despise the dormant Commerce Clause that they no
longer call it by its usual name. Instead, because the Clause "does
not appear in the Constitution," Justices Scalia and Thomas call
it the "negative" Commerce Clause.4 Move over, Voldemort: the
dormant Commerce Clause is the provision that must not be
named. Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas, however, has
completely forsworn the Clause's jurisprudential and political
underpinnings.' Rather, each of these Justices has offered a doc-
trinal alternative grounded in concrete constitutional text. Jus-
tice Thomas has proposed replacing "the judicially created nega-
tive Commerce Clause" with what he considers the "original"
meaning of the "Import-Export Clause" of Article I, Section 10 as
a "check on discriminatory state taxation."6 For his part, Justice
2. See, e.g., Michael DeBow, Codifying the Dormant Commerce Clause,
1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 69, 73; Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429-35 (1982); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commer-
cial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217; Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism,
1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 571-73, 582-90, 617; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as
a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Consti-
tutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 888 (1985); Mark Tushnet, Rethink-
ing the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125.
3. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995); see also Kaz-
mier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 531 (5th Cir. 2000) ('[Tihe support of even [a]
prominent... academician is an inadequate substitute for.., recent Supreme
Court precedent."); Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that the Supreme Court's opinion is the law, "Whatever law professors or
even professional historians may say"), vacated per curiam on other grounds,
165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999). See generally Scott C. Idleman, Of Judicial Su-
premacy and Academic Inadequacy, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 5 (2001).
4. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring); accord Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Har-
rison, 520 U.S. 564, 609 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("There is, quite
frankly, nothing 'dormant' about our jurisprudence in this area.").
5. Cf Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 617-18 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (I suspect we have... adhered to the negative Commerce Clause be-
cause we believed it necessary to check state measures contrary to the perceived
spirit, if not the actual letter, of the Constitution.").
6. Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Import-Export Clause provides
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Scalia has suggested that the task of "guarding against rank dis-
crimination" by any one state "against citizens of other States"
should be "regulated not by the Commerce Clause but by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause" of Article IV, Section 2.'
In a pair of thoughtful and thought-provoking articles, Pro-
fessor Brannon Denning has skillfully skewered Justices Scalia
and Thomas's proposals. In the winter 1999 issue of the Univer-
sity of Colorado Law Review, Professor Denning exposed the limi-
tations of the Import-Export Clause.8 In the December 2003 issue
of this journal, Professor Denning showed how the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV cannot supplant the dormant
Commerce Clause.9 These articles demonstrate that the Import-
Export and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, at least absent
"major rethinking," are "not... up to the task of displacing the
dormant commerce clause as the doctrinal basis for the Court's
regulation of state protectionism and externalities." ° The Import-
Export Clause, even if applied to domestic trade," would patrol
only discriminatory taxation and not regulation.1 2 As long as a
state directs regulation toward an interstate stream of commerce
rather than natural persons conducting that commerce, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause exerts no restraint on even bla-
tantly discriminatory regulation. Banning the export of minnows
from Oklahoma, for instance, deprives Texans of no right, privi-
in relevant part: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely neces-
sary for executing its inspection Laws...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
7. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Privileges
and Immunities Clause provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 1.
8. Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-Export Clause, and
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155 (1999).
9. Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Arti-
cle IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 384 (2003).
10. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Un-
steady Path" A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1447, 1488 (1995); accord Denning, supra note 9, at 408 n.117.
11. Contra Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 131, 132-33 (1869)
(holding that the terms "imposts," "imports," and "exports" as used in the Con-
stitution apply solely to "articles... brought from a country foreign to the
United States"); Denning, supra note 8, at 162-63 (discussing Woodruff, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 123).
12. See Denning supra note 8, at 216-17, 223.
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lege, or immunity enjoyed by Oklahomans. 3 When facially neu-
tral state laws impair interstate commerce, neither the Import-
Export Clause nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause ap-
proaches the flexibility of the dormant Commerce Clause balanc-
ing test articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. ,,' which may be
precisely what critics of the Clause hope to jettison. 5
At a minimum, Professor Denning's thorough scholarship
has placed the onus of "explanation and defense" squarely on
those who advocate the Import-Export and Privileges and Immu-
nities Clauses as replacements for the dormant Commerce
Clause. In their zeal to condemn the dormant Commerce Clause
"as a paradigmatic example of 'judicial activism,"' judicial and
academic critics have overstated "the doctrine's lack of foundation
in text and history."16 Professor Denning's message is unmistak-
able: Pending further proof, let sleeping dogs lie.
Among the many hounds in the contemporary Supreme
Court docket,1 7 dormant Commerce Clause controversies are
likely to retain their prominent place within this kennel of "bor-
ing"8 and "peewee" 9 cases. Although Justices Scalia and Thomas
have convinced only Chief Justice Rehnquist to endorse their at-
tack on the dormant Commerce Clause, any coalition of three
Justices enjoys a palpable prospect of eventually overhauling or
even overruling outright any disfavored constitutional doctrine.
Given the right cases in the docket, shared will, and (most impor-
tant of all) five reliable votes, any group of Justices can "cast
13. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). For examples of similarly
discriminatory laws, which are almost invariably invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause, see Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992); New Eng-
land Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 252 U.S. 563 (1920).
14. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where [a state] statute regulates evenhand-
edly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." (ci-
tation omitted)).
15. See Denning, supra note 9, at 413.
16. Denning, supra note 8, at 223.
17. For thoughts on how today's Supreme Court docket became so puny and
doctrinally narrow, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist
Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 569 (2003).
18. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice & "Boring" Cases, 4
GREEN BAG 2D 401, 407 (2001).
19. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 128 (1979) (quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan); accord
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential" Cases and
Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1996).
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overboard numerous settled decisions, and indeed even whole ar-
eas of law, with an unceremonious 'heave-ho."'2 ° Today's three-
Justice dissent may become tomorrow's five-Justice majority.21 In
the face of this threat to a besieged body of law, Professor
Denning has helped to reinvigorate the intellectual case for con-
tinued adherence to the dormant Commerce Clause.
Most existing theoretical defenses of the dormant Commerce
Clause stress the economic distortion that would run riot in its
absence.22 Justice Jackson contrasted the "material success" at-
tributable to the preservation of a "federal free trade unit" with
the "fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals [that oth-
erwise] would ensue."23 Undoubtedly conscious that state and lo-
cal governments remain "the source of most of the anticompeti-
tive restraints remaining in the American economy,"24 economic
defenses of dormant Commerce Clause review seek "to ensure
that resources flow to their most highly valued uses, unob-
structed by state laws that have the capacity to undermine a uni-
fied national market."25 Especially to the extent that "Our Feder-
alism" 26 means whatever five Supreme Court Justices at any
moment want it to mean, it makes little sense to transform the
mirage of local sovereignty into an engine of economic destruc-
tion.
By contrast, process-based defenses typically describe the
benefits of economic union as a political virtue worth protecting
by constitutional means.2 ' This argument invokes the political
20. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 109 (1993) (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
21. See, e.g., CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 68 (1928) (describing each dissent as "an appeal to the brooding
spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may
possibly correct the error into which... the court [has ostensibly] been be-
trayed"). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986); Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the
Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 378,
453-58(1996).
23. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1949).
24. Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the
Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44
EMORY L.J. 1227, 1254 (1995). See generally Karl Manheim, New-Age Federal-
ism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559 (1990).
25. Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 154 (2003).
26. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
27. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
[Vol 88:17641768
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value of protecting outsiders from self-dealing by in-state voters.
The Supreme Court understands that a "regulation [whose] ...
burden falls principally upon those without the state... is not
likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are nor-
mally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some in-
terests within the state."29 In his contribution to this journal, Pro-
fessor Denning himself tantalizingly promises "a very
preliminary structural defense" of the dormant Commerce
Clause.3" The process-based approach, however, seems to owe
closer allegiance to its underlying substantive norms than to the
dormant Commerce Clause as such. Commentators therefore
speculate whether antidiscrimination and freedom of movement
might be better vindicated through the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.3'
In this reply to Professor Denning, I wish to make a modest
and highly tentative effort to accomplish the unusual academic
feat of defending Supreme Court doctrine in its current form. 32 I
will sketch the outlines of an argument that Professor Denning
dismisses as "one on which contemporary defenders of [dormant
Commerce Clause] doctrine [do not] rely."3 Congress's persistent
failure to repeal the dormant Commerce Clause is the singularly
impressive feature of American constitutionalism's approach to
protecting free trade. Though it has failed to win academic sup-
port, congressional silence provides at least an adequate and per-
haps even a persuasive case for preserving the dormant Com-
merce Clause. The law review equivalent of an extended letter to
the editor is hardly the place for a comprehensive study of silence
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Re-
straints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789,
806-13 (1996) (construing the Commerce Clause at large as a shield against co-
ercive taxation and other comparably destructive behavior under state law). See
generally Matthew Adler, What States Owe Outsiders, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
391 (1993); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEx. L. REV.
1097 (1988).
29. S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2
(1938).
30. Denning, supra note 9, at 414 n.139.
31. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Perspectives on the American Common Mar-
ket, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 59, 65 (A. Dan
Tarlock ed., 1981).
32. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3
CONST. COMMENT. 307 (1986); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293
(1984).
33. Denning, supra note 8, at 172 n.94.
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and its legal significance,34 and I make no claim to theoretical
completeness across the entire fabric of American constitutional
law.35 I hope at a minimum, however, that I might persuade Pro-
fessor Denning to reconsider his suggestion that "[n]o sophisti-
cated, contemporary theorist" would argue that congressional si-
lence has effectively ratified the dormant Commerce Clause."
My argument proceeds in the following fashion. As a general
rule, Congress cannot override judicial interpretations of the
Constitution merely by passing ordinary legislation. The dormant
Commerce Clause is an important exception. Despite enjoying
virtually unfettered discretion to override dormant Commerce
Clause decisions, Congress has rarely used that power. Constitu-
tional significance abides throughout: in order to evaluate the
propriety of contemporary dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
we must assess not only Congress's power to override the courts,
but also Congress's actual course of performance in the exercise
of that power. Part II of this essay examines the theoretical ques-
tion of congressional competence, or capacity. Congress's power to
square state law with the Commerce Clause should not be com-
pared with, but rather distinguished from, other constitutional
doctrines that limit state and local authority over the national
economy. A pair of Supremacy Clause doctrines-
intergovernmental immunity and preemption-provide especially
useful analogies.
Part III takes an unapologetically pragmatic view of congres-
sional performance.7 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine ef-
34. See generally, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES ch. 4
(1985); Henry Wolf Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARV. L. REV. 200 (1927);
Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of
Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
35. For more extensive efforts to explain constitutional theory and doctrine
along lines similar to those I endorse here, see William Cohen, Congressional
Power to Define State Power to Regulate Commerce: Consent and Pre-emption, in
2 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 523 (Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein eds., 1982); William Cohen, Con-
gressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution
to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1983); Philip P. Frickey, A Common
Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Au-
thority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999); Henry P. Monaghan, The Su-
preme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1975).
36. Denning, supra note 8, at 172 n.94.
37. I derive the analytical distinction between competence and performance
from NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 4 (1965). I admit
that the connection between linguistic theory and legal doctrine is not readily
apparent to most observers, but I do attempt to explain the link in Jim Chen,
1770 [Vol 88:1764
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fectively treats the Commerce Clause as though it were an initial
assignment of common law authority to the federal courts. Con-
gress's persistent failure to reassign that authority to itself, to
federal regulatory agencies, or to the states suggests that the fed-
eral courts have demonstrated reasonably sound judgment on is-
sues of interstate trade and taxation. This meritorious history
deserves constitutional respect. Part IV concludes that a prag-
matic approach to constitutional law-one that treats questions
of rights, privileges, duties, powers, and immunities as if they
mattered in more than a strictly theoretical sense, as if they ma-
terially affected the well-being of real human beings--can hap-
pily accept the de facto ratification of the dormant Commerce
Clause through congressional inaction.
II. CONGRESSIONAL SUPREMACY OVER COMMERCE
Without doubt the dormant Commerce Clause has pro-
foundly affected the "oldest question of constitutional law."38
Strong influence on the law of federalism, however, may have ob-
scured the centrality of separation of powers principles to a doc-
trinally coherent defense of the dormant Commerce Clause. As a
matter of comparative institutional competence, the political
branches of government dramatically underperform their judicial
counterpart in vindicating the democratic values inherent in eco-
nomic union and free trade. The Constitution's entire complex of
provisions fostering a unified national market-including not
only the Commerce Clause but also the Privileges and Immuni-
ties, Import-Export, and Tonnage Clauses-would fall woefully
short of their aspirations if they relied exclusively on legislative
enforcement." Almost any legal system that hopes to ensure the
free movement of goods, services, and labor must vest significant
responsibility in a judicial body. In Washington as in Brussels or
Geneva, "the political reality ... of mercantilism" shoves onto un-
elected courts the responsibility for preserving free trade.4 ° Since
Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263 (1995).
38. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992); see also H. Jeffer-
son Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633
(1993).
39. Cf Denning, supra note 8, at 159 (acknowledging that at least the Im-
port-Export Clause may be significantly underenforced). See generally Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
40. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory
State: A GATTs-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1401, 1406 (1994).
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the Marshall era,4' or at least since the Taney era,42 the Supreme
Court has reviewed state and local restraints on national trade
under the authority of the Commerce Clause. Congress has had
many opportunities to reject this vast body ofjudicially developed
law. Only rarely has Congress intervened, and the very rarity of
congressional action on this front represents a form of de facto
constitutional ratification in its own right.
Congressional inaction means nothing to the harshest judi-
cial critics of the dormant Commerce Clause. Neither Justice
Scalia nor Justice Thomas gives any credit to "the idea that in en-
forcing the negative Commerce Clause the Court is not applying
a constitutional command at all, but is merely interpreting the
will of [a silent] Congress."43 Justice Scalia finds no "conceivable
reason why congressional inaction under the Commerce Clause
should be deemed to have the same pre-emptive effect elsewhere
accorded only to congressional action."4 Indeed, Justice Scalia
ridicules this suggestion as "[t] he least plausible ... justification
of all."45 In this setting as in any other, Justice Scalia regards
"vindication by congressional inaction [as] a canard.""
For his part, Justice Thomas has also rejected "the 'pre-
emption-by-silence' rationale."'7 Most troubling to him, "the 'pre-
emption-by-silence' rationale virtually amounts to legislation by
default, in apparent violation of the constitutional requirements
of bicameralism and presentment."' Professor Denning evidently
shares at least part of these Justices' discomfort with the notion
that a silent Congress should "be presumed to intend that" all ar-
eas of commerce not yet addressed by it should "be left unregu-
lated" altogether.49 He calls this presumption "an old, but suspect,
justification" for the dormant Commerce Clause.5 °
41. See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
42. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); The Pas-
senger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504 (1847).
43. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
262 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
47. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
615 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 617 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983)).
49. Denning, supra note 9, at 398.
50. Id.
1772 [Vol 88:1764
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By Justice Scalia's own admission, however, the "'legislation
by inaction' theory of the negative Commerce Clause seems to be
the only basis for the doctrine... that Congress can authorize
States to enact legislation that would otherwise violate the nega-
tive Commerce Clause."51 One of the most distinctive characteris-
tics of the dormant Commerce Clause as constitutional doctrine is
Congress's virtually limitless ability to override the Supreme
Court. As Professor Denning correctly recognizes, "Congress, not
the Court, has the final say on whether a particular state regula-
tion of interstate commerce is permissible."52 "If Congress ordains
that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate com-
merce, any action taken by a State within the scope of the con-
gressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce
Clause challenge."53 To put it somewhat differently, Congress
may "confer... upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of
interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy."54 In-
deed, the Court quite strongly presumes that congressional "inac-
tion" should be "equivalent to a declaration that inter-State
commerce shall be free and untrammelled. 55 "[T]he failure of
Congress to make express regulations indicates its will that [a]
subject shall be left free from any restrictions or impositions; and
any regulation of the subject by the states, except in matters of
local concern only,.. . is repugnant to such freedom.5 6 Congress
must clearly express any contrary intent "to authorize state regu-
lations that burden or discriminate against interstate com-
merce."
57
Although congressional power to countermand constitutional
decisions with ordinary legislation is not limited to the Commerce
Clause setting, Congress's ability to second-guess the Justices
does distinguish the dormant Commerce Clause from two other
51. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
263 n.4 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id.
("Nothing else could explain the ... principle that what was invalid state action
can be rendered valid state action through 'congressional consent.').
52. See Denning, supra note 9, at 397.
53. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53
(1981); see also Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 123 S. Ct. 2142, 2147 (2003); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 412 (1946).
54. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc. 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); see also, e.g.,
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992).
55. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876).
56. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 493 (1887).
57. Hillside Dairy, 123 S. Ct. at 2147; see also S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-92 (1984) (plurality opinion).
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doctrines that establish antidiscrimination norms within the na-
tional marketplace. Judicial decisions under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Equal Protection Clause
are not subject to further legislative review. The great Julian
Eule was flatly wrong to suggest that Congress can use its ordi-
nary legislative powers to insulate states from judicial scrutiny
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.58 Congress can do
no such thing. Justice Scalia errs in the opposite direction when
he asserts, without qualification, that "[t]here is surely no area in
which Congress can permit the States to violate the Constitu-
tion."59 There are certain instances in which the Constitution
merely establishes a presumptive rule, subject to congressional
revision through ordinary legislation. But the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause is not one of those instances. Professor Denning
has the better of the argument: unlike the Commerce Clause, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause "is not even addressed to Con-
gress," let alone an affirmative "grant of power." ° "Rather, it is an
unqualified prohibition of state discrimination on the basis of
state citizenship."6' Violations of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause therefore follow the default rule in constitutional adjudi-
cation, which blocks Congress from curing a constitutional viola-
tion by excusing the offending state.62
Likewise, when a court uses the Equal Protection Clause to
invalidate a state law that discriminates on the basis of state citi-
zenship,3 Congress cannot cure the state's Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation. The most celebrated instance of congressional
override of a dormant Commerce Clause decision, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act of 1945,64 "remove[d] entirely any Commerce
Clause restriction upon [the states'] power to tax [or regulate] the
insurance business."6' The McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, did
"not purport" to invoke Congress's power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, let alone to claim "the final say as to what
58. See Eule, supra note 2, at 454.
59. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
263 n.4 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Denning, supra note 9, at 399.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 412.
63. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985); Zobel v. Wil-
liams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See generally Denning, supra note 9, at 386 n.6.
64. Act of March 9, 1945, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-
1015 (1984)).
65. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 655
(1981).
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constitutes due process [or equal protection] under the Four-
teenth Amendment."66 Any attempt by Congress to override a ju-
dicial definition of the equal protection rights enjoyed by out-of-
state businesses would probably meet withering judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has "consistently held that Congress may not
authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment."67
Section 5's grant of authority to "enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment through "appropriate legislation,"68 after all, does not
empower Congress "to determine what constitutes a constitu-
tional violation."69 "Legislation which alters the meaning of the
[Equal Protection] Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause."" If "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by"
using Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "chang[e] what
the right is,"7 judicial opprobium must be that much greater
should Congress arrogate a "power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute"
rights guaranteed by Section 1.2
Admittedly, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution does en-
able Congress to "[c]onsent" to states' "Imposts or Duties on Im-
ports or Exports"73 and to "Dut[ies] of Tonnage" laid by the
states. 4 The Constitution goes so far as to emphasize that all
laws regarding imposts or duties on imports or exports "shall be
subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress."75 Moreover,
even as it presumptively prohibits states from "enter[ing] into
any Agreement or Compact with [other] State[s], "76 the Constitu-
tion also permits Congress to consent to such compacts. Congres-
sional "power to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it under
appropriate conditions" constitutes a form of "national supervi-
sion" over interstate compacts as a form of cooperative lawmak-
66. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 457 (1962); ac-
cord Metro. Life, 470 U.S. at 880 n.8; W. & S., 451 U.S. at 655 n.6.
67. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
69. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966); see also id.
("Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to establish racially
segregated systems of education would not be-as required by § 5-a measure
'to enforce' the Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own force prohib-
its such state laws.").
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
74. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
75. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
76. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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77ing. The congressionally sanctioned interstate compact "is more
than a supple device for dealing with interests confined within a
region"; it can also be "a means of safeguarding the national in-
terest."78 Once conferred, "congressional consent transforms an
interstate compact... into a law of the United States."79 But the
Constitution's very grant of congressional authority to consent to
these types of state laws provides very strong evidence that the
Constitution authorizes no act of Congress that would excuse a
state from the obligation to extend its citizens' "Privileges and
Immunities" to the citizens of all other states. ° Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius:81 when the drafters of the Constitution
"sought to confer [the] special power [" of congressional consent to
a presumptively unconstitutional practice, "they did so in explicit,
unambiguous terms.""
Despite its brevity, this comparative analysis of constitu-
tional text establishes that Article IV's Privileges and Immunities
Clause belongs to the large set of constitutional provisions that
do not permit a simple act of Congress to excuse or waive what
would otherwise be a constitutional violation by a state. By con-
trast, Article I, Section 10 explicitly contemplates circumstances
in which Congress might allow a state to levy imposts or duties
on imports or exports, to impose tonnage duties, or to enter a
compact with other states. The Fourteenth Amendment falls in
the usual set rather than the exception: Congress has the power
to "enforce" all three Reconstruction amendments "by appropriate
legislation,"83 but such power offers no basis for insulating dis-
77. Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 282 n.7 (1959); cf
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148, (1937) ("It can hardly be
doubted that in giving consent [to a compact] Congress may impose conditions.").
See generally Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
78. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951).
79. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981); accord Texas v. New Mexico,
462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see Denning, supra note 9, at 411; see also
id. at 399 ("[U]nlike other limitations on state power listed in Article I, Section
10, the Privileges and Immunities Clause contains no provision for congressional
waiver .... ").
81. E.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995); Leather-
man v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993); cf O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) ("Inclu-
sio unius, exclusio alterius.").
82. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983); see also Denning, supra note 9,
at 412 ("[The Framers knew how to allow Congress to waive restrictions on the
states and did so in other [constitutional] provisions.").
83. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2; XIV, § 5; XV, § 2. See generally, e.g.,
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criminatory state laws from equal protection or due process re-
view by the courts.
How then should one view Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause to excuse state and local laws that otherwise
would be subject to harsher judicial review under the dormant
Commerce Clause? The closest analogy involves the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity. M'Culloch v. Maryland84 estab-
lished that states may not tax the property and instrumentalities
of the federal government and, correlatively, that federal courts
may review state laws for compliance with this doctrine.85 Like
the dormant Commerce Clause, this power of review was not so
much given by the Constitution as it was snatched by judges on
the scantiest of textual authority. Constitutional text offers no
hint that the Supremacy Clause might be used to curb the states'
power over taxation.86 As a matter of constitutional text, what Ar-
ticle VI defines as the "supreme Law of the Land" demands more
than congressional inaction. The Supremacy Clause subjugates
state law to "[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States."8'7
In truth, the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine rests
on little authority beyond John Marshall's naked assertion that a
government guided by "the very essence of supremacy [would]
remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and...
modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to ex-
empt its own operations from their own influence. "8 Neverthe-
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980) (equating the stan-
dards for judicial review of Congress's power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment and of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (holding that
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment "clothed 'Congress with power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery'"
(quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
84. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
85. See id. at 425-37. For a succinct and reasonably up-to-date summary of
the doctrine's limitations on state and local taxation, see South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988).
86. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land....").
87. Id.
88. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427; see also Daniel A. Farber, The
Story of McCullocl Banking on National Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STORIES 33, 57 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall
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less, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine entitles courts to
invalidate state laws in the name of federal supremacy, even in
the absence of federal legislation. Finally, like the dormant
Commerce Clause, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine al-
lows Congress to waive the federal government's immunity from
state taxation. 9
The intergovernmental immunity doctrine and the dormant
Commerce Clause are structurally similar. Each doctrine se-
verely restricts state taxation or regulation without explicit au-
thorization in the text of the Constitution. Rather, each doctrine
derives its strength from the structure of the Constitution and a
judicial instinct that federal interests should prevail over state
interests, at least in the first instance. Attaching each doctrine to
some identifiable scrap of constitutional text, whether the Su-
premacy Clause or the Commerce Clause, seems arbitrary at best
and gratuitous at worst. Each doctrine gives Congress virtually
unreviewable discretion to redelegate complete authority over
taxation or regulation back to the states, typically after a judicial
decision to the contrary has cued the issue for further legislative
consideration. The only surprise lies in the apparent hypocrisy of
those who endorse M'Culloch's mantra, "the power to tax [is] the
power to destroy,"90 but decry the analytically parallel dormant
Commerce Clause as a nontextual usurpation ofjudicial power to
interpret the Constitution.
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence offers another baseline for
comparison. Many aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine operate as the functional equivalent of preemption. Al-
though preemption nominally raises a constitutional question
controlled by the Supremacy Clause, "[p]re-emption fundamen-
tally is a question of congressional intent."9' Preemption "is com-
pelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
"cite[d] no authority for this proposition" and instead "presented [it] as a self-
evident truth which only an idiot could deny").
89. See, e.g., West v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 334 U.S. 717, 723 (1948); United
States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 188 (1946); Van Brocklin v. Tennes-
see, 117 U.S. 151, 175 (1886).
90. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427.
91. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); see also Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141, 142 (1977) (per curiam) ("While federal pre-
emption of state statutes is, of course, ultimately a question under the Suprem-
acy Clause,... analysis of pre-emption issues depends primarily on statutory
and not constitutional interpretation." (citation omitted)).
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purpose."92 "Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its
enactments pre-empt state law."93 "When Congress has made its
intent [to preempt state law] through explicit statutory language,
the courts' task is an easy one."94 In all other instances, a finding
of preemption requires some judicial leap of faith. "Implied" pre-
emption arises not only when "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility,"95 but also when
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."96 At an ex-
treme, "field" preemption displaces state law to the extent that it
regulates conduct in a field over which Congress intended to re-
serve exclusive federal control. Such broadly preemptive intent
may be inferred from a "scheme of federal regulation.., so per-
vasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States," or where an "Act of Congress... touch[es] a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system [presumably] preclude[s] state laws on the same sub-
ject.,97
The Supreme Court's preemption recipes list ingredients fa-
• • 98
miliar to any connoisseur of statutory interpretation. But the
dish as a whole reeks of constitutional lawmaking. It bears re-
membering, after all, that preemption is an outgrowth of the Su-
premacy Clause. Relative to the intergovernmental immunity
doctrine, preemption claims at most a marginally firmer basis in
constitutional text.
Moreover, the Court's preemption decisions have adopted
almost squarely contradictory presumptions that expose the
highly indeterminate and political nature of this doctrine. On one
hand, many preemption decisions "start[]with the assumption
92. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); accord, e.g., Fid.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
93. English, 496 U.S. at 78. See generally, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983).
94. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
95. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
accord, e.g., Fid. Fed., 458 U.S. at 153.
96. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1967); accord, e.g., Fid. Fed., 458
U.S. at 153.
97. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); accord, e.g.,
English, 496 U.S. at 79; Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-
300 (1988).
98. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis,
70 Thx. L. REV. 1073 (1992).
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that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be super-
ceded by [a] ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress."'99 One might imagine that such a clear
statement rule would very effectively shield state law from pre-
emption whenever Congress adopts an explicit "savings" clause in
order to reserve breathing space for state law within an other-
wise comprehensive federal statutory scheme. One would be
wrong. The Supreme Court routinely "decline[s] to give broad ef-
fect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful
regulatory scheme established by federal law,"'0 choosing on
those occasions to reassert the national prerogatives implicit in
the doctrine of "field" preemption. The Justices have also
stressed, contrary to other doctrines that purport to protect the
sovereignty of the states, that "the relative importance to the
State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a
valid federal law." °1 Rather than railing against the Supreme
Court for developing a judicial doctrine that lives only by con-
gressional sufferance, a true textualist would reserve true out-
rage for these dueling presumptions' shabby treatment of laws
that Congress has actually passed.
Despite the functional similarities between preemption and
the dormant Commerce Clause, preemption inspires little of the
visceral and passionate opposition attracted by its Commerce
Clause counterpart. Though no fan of field preemption,02 Justice
Thomas assigns fairly heavy significance to the fact that Con-
gress has affirmatively passed a statute. He infers no "Veneer of
legitimacy" for the dormant Commerce Clause from the doctrines
99. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (second,
fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230); accord,
e.g., Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997); see also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85
(1994) (opining that "matters left unaddressed" even in an otherwise "compre-
hensive and detailed" system of "federal statutory regulation" should be "pre-
sumably left subject to... disposition[s] provided by state law").
100. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000); accord Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000); see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent.
Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1998); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cot-
ton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907).
101. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (reasoning that "the Framers of
our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail" in cases of conflict
with state law); accord, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982); see also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1981).
102. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 616-17 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing "field pre-emption
[as] ... suspect, at least as applied in the absence of a congressional command
that a particular field be pre-empted").
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of implied and field preemption! °3 Given the realities of contem-
porary constitutional doctrine, however, the line between field
preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause is at best razor-
thin and often imperceptible. Once upon a time the Supreme
Court used to fret that an expansive interpretation of Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce would displace the tradi-
tional police power of the states over "not only manufactures, but
also agriculture, horticulture, stock-raising, domestic fisheries,
mining-in short, every branch of human industry.""4 Contempo-
rary federal law reaches each of those fields and more. Although
an honest assessment of the federal government's regulatory
reach today probably "would leave the framers 'rubbing their
eyes' with amazement,""5 it has become equally "clear that...
Congress has authority to regulate virtually all private economic
activity.'1
0 6
It is far from self-evident that constitutional lawmaking
through preemption enjoys greater legitimacy than the dormant
Commerce Clause. The proliferation of substantive canons of
statutory interpretation, whether inspired by the Supremacy
Clause or by other provisions of the federal government's basic
charter, is nothing short of "stealth" constitutional law.0 7 Given
the sheer extent of federal legislation, a court that truly wishes to
invalidate a state law because of its incompatibility with the na-
103. Id. at 616.
104. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888); see also United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
105. Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 658 (2000); ef New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (noting that "[tihe Federal Government undertakes activi-
ties . . . unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers
would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities;
and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Gov-
ernment, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities").
106. Earl M. Maltz, The Impact of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 on
the Dormant Commerce Clause-A Case Study in the Decline of State Autonomy,
19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 121, 129 (1995); cf Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 129-30 (arguing
that the embrace of "commerce today" around "practically every activity of social
life" should enable Congress "to reach, through regulation, practically every ac-
tivity of social life," even though "the scope of the powers now exercised by Con-
gress far exceeds that imagined by the framers").
107. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81-87
(1994).
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tionwide economy need not invoke the dormant Commerce
Clause. Though perhaps not the most honest way of accomplish-
ing that goal, an aggressive finding of field preemption remains
within the reach of any court willing to stretch the scope of an ex-
isting federal statute. Whatever else might be said of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, that doctrine does represent an un-
equivocal and unapologetic exercise of judicial power. Justice
Scalia's lament in a different constitutional context should be re-
garded as a panegyric: "this wolf comes as a wolf."" 8
One final wrinkle in the interplay between Congress and the
courts cements the functional kinship between preemption and
the dormant Commerce Clause. As I have already noted, Con-
gress enjoys virtually unfettered discretion to reassign responsi-
bility over an aspect of interstate commerce. As a general rule,
Congress may choose to delegate regulatory responsibility over
interstate commerce to the states. Complete delegation negates
any judicial role under the dormant Commerce Clause. Congress
may also elect to craft a more nuanced approach to "cooperative
federalism" by adopting a careful mix of expressly preemptive
statutory provisions and savings clauses.'09 But Congress does
not necessarily have the final say. Under either model, the courts
may freely reconstitutionalize the issue-namely, insulate it en-
tirely from congressional override-by asserting meaningful judi-
cial limits on Congress's Commerce Clause powers. An act of
Congress has no preemptive effect on state law, and no Suprem-
acy Clause issue arises, if the law exceeds Congress's power to
regulate commerce among the several states.
Presumably the Supreme Court's renewed interest in scruti-
nizing Congress's use of the commerce power-expressed most
prominently in cases such as United States v. Lopez" ° and United
States v. Morrison"'1 -should have the incidental effect of restrict-
108. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68; Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
110. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
111. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Other cases suggest that the Court is aggressively
transforming the traditional rule on interpreting statutes so as to avoid raising
doubts about constitutionality, see, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catho-
lic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979), into "a roving commission to construe all
meaningful life out of regulatory statutes that offend a majority of the Justices."
Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1754 (2003); see Solid Waste
Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (invali-
dating the Corps's "migratory bird" rule in order "to avoid the significant consti-
tutional and federalism questions raised" by the rule's interpretation of the term
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ing the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court's rein-
vigorated dedication to assert clear "distinction [s] between what
is truly national and what is truly local" should place certain sub-
jects wholly beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause, no matter
which branch of the federal government seeks to assert that
power.1 12 What lies beyond Congress's legislative power a fortiori
lies beyond the derivative power of the courts to subject state and
local laws to dormant Commerce Clause review.
This perfectly logical limit to the dormant Commerce Clause
has been known at least since 1978. That year, Philadelphia v.
New Jersey"' held that the dormant Commerce Clause authorizes
judicial scrutiny of any state law that restricts movement in any
market where Congress enjoys an affirmative power to regu-
late.114 To the extent that contemporary doctrine has curbed Con-
gress's ability to legislate under this provision of the Constitu-
tion, judicial review under the dormant Commerce Clause should
correlatively shrink. None of the opponents of the dormant Com-
merce Clause on the contemporary Court, however, has ex-
pressed any interest in wielding this latent limit on judicial re-
view of state and local laws affecting the national economy, even
though decisions such as Lopez and Morrison would logically dic-
tate a significant reduction in the scope of dormant Commerce
Clause review. Much as a squatter might refuse an eminently af-
fordable lease for fear of conceding another claimant's title to dis-
puted land, perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas have avoided invoking this limit on the dormant
Commerce Clause in order to preserve the sanctity of their as-
sault on the doctrine's legitimacy. Empirical examination of vot-
ing behavior on the Rehnquist Court suggests that Justices
Scalia and Thomas sometimes seem to "prefer scoring ideological
points" over assembling winning coalitions "and may even be
willing to sacrifice an occasional imperfect victory" in order to
maintain ideological purity."5 If this is true, then the leading ju-
dicial opponents of the dormant Commerce Clause are registering
"navigable waters" within the Clean Water Act); Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (holding that the federal arson statute "covers only property
currently used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce," in order to
avoid casting doubt on the statute's constitutionality after Lopez).
112. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
113. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
114. See id. at 622-23.
115. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides
Again: Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MiNN. L. REV. 131, 212
(2001).
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complaints about the doctrine's putative illegitimacy at the ex-
pense of using workable, readily available constitutional doctrine
to impose very real and potentially significant limits on the abil-
ity of federal courts to second-guess state and local lawmakers.
III. ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT
"Although Congress unquestionably has the power to repu-
diate or substantially modify [the dormant Commerce Clause's]
course of adjudication, it has not done so."116 This singular fact
provides a "contemporary explanation" that Professor Denning
comes close to endorsing explicitly: the dormant Commerce
Clause is "grounded simply on Congress's ability to regulate
commerce in a way that delegates power over commerce to the
states.""7 The courts have seized what amounts to a broad power
of review under the Commerce Clause, but Congress can restore
order any time it chooses.
As a matter of practice rather than theory, Congress has
very rarely used its Commerce Clause powers to retract an issue
from judicial reach and to reassign it to the states. Any fair re-
view of dormant Commerce Clause decisions over time would re-
veal relatively little congressional dissatisfaction. Indeed, specific
instances of congressional waiver in direct response to a dormant
Commerce Clause decision are quite rare.
The most celebrated instances in which Congress has over-
ridden judicial interpretations of the dormant Commerce Clause
have involved either liquor or financial services. (Whether these
subjects are truly separated in time rather than space is left as
an exercise for the reader.) When the Supreme Court decided in
1890 that the regulation of alcoholic beverages lay beyond the
reach of the states,' Congress promptly overrode that decision.
Within a year, the Supreme Court acknowledged and approved
the congressional override." 9 As prohibitionist sentiment reached
fever pitch a generation later, the Court again upheld Congress's
authority to commit the regulation of liquor imports to state au-
thority. 
120
116. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
572 (1997) (footnote omitted).
117. Denning, supra note 9, at 398.
118. See Leisyv. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
119. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891).
120. See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 326-32 (1917)
(upholding the Webb-Kenyon Act).
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945121 is probably the best
known and most enduring example of congressional override of
the dormant Commerce Clause. In the 1868 decision of Paul v.
Virginia,' perhaps better known for its holding that corporations
do not fall within the meaning of "citizen" under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause , the Supreme Court held that insur-
ance contracts "do not constitute a part of the commerce between
the States any more than a contract for the purchase and sale of
goods in Virginia by a citizen of New York whilst in Virginia
would constitute a portion of such commerce." 24 In 1944, the Su-
preme Court overruled Paul in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n,'2' thereby exposing massive amounts of state
insurance regulation to potentially withering judicial scrutiny. By
"remov[ing] all Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of
the states to regulate and tax the business of insurance,"26 the
McCarran-Ferguson Act restored the states' traditional preroga-
tive to regulate the business of insurance. 127 With less fanfare, the
Court has also upheld the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956128
as a similar displacement of dormant Commerce Clause review.
129
A quick and admittedly incomplete survey of dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence reveals precious few other episodes
in which Congress has explicitly lifted a judicially imposed re-
straint on state or local regulation of the interstate economy.
Since Justice Scalia began his attack on the dormant Commerce
Clause in 1987, I can think of only two instances in which Con-
gress has overridden a Supreme Court decision interpreting the
dormant Commerce Clause. Neither instance involved overt con-
gressional hostility to the work of the Court. First, the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982130 originally confirmed the
Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Kassel v. Consolidated
121. Act of March 9, 1945, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-
1015 (1984)).
122. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
123. See id. at 178-82; Denning, supra note 9, at 394-96.
124. Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 183.
125. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
126. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653
(1981).
127. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 n.8 (1985); W. & S.,
451 U.S. at 652-53.
128. Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 6, 70 Stat. 137.
129. See Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985).
130. Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1982).
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Freightways Corp.'31 to restrict state regulation of truck lengths,
but evidently did so in order to compensate the interstate truck-
ing industry for an increase in federal taxes on gasoline, diesel
fuel, and truck weight.12 In the 1994 amendments to the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act, Congress partially overruled Kas-
sel by permitting states in some circumstances to bar large trucks
from interstate highways.
The second instance produced even more ambiguous evi-
dence of a congressional override. Although the Northeast Inter-
state Dairy Compact had been the subject of negotiations since at
least 1988, Congress's decision to ratify the compact in 1996 may
be viewed as a response to the 1994 Supreme Court decision in
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,3 which invalidated a Massa-
chusetts scheme to raise wholesale prices received by in-state
dairy farmers. Over objections that the compact would insulate
the New England milkshed from fierce competition by other
dairy-producing regions, Congress ratified the compact in order
to deliver income support to dairy farmers throughout New Eng-
land.135 The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact thus became
part of the 1996 "farm bill," the federal government's periodic
overhaul of its agricultural legislation. 136 Only opponents of the
compact, however, mentioned the connection with West Lynn,
and it is unclear whether proponents seriously considered the in-
compatibility between the compact and the deep body of dormant
Commerce Clause decisions involving the marketing and pricing
of milk.
137
131. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
132. See Steven C. Kohl, Recent Development, Constitutional Law-Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp.: "Goodbuddy" Raymond Revisited in Name
Only, 8 J. CORP. L. 543, 563-64 (1983).
133. See Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1(e), 108 Stat. 745, 993
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000)); Harold J. Krent, How to Move
Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: Structuring Judicial Response to Legislative Re-
form Efforts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 855, 858 n.17 (1999).
134. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
135. See S. REP. No. 103-333, at 33-34 (1994) (accompanying S. 2069, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)) (additional views of Sen. Hatch). For further discussion of
the dairy compact, see generally Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467,
1471 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 949 F. Supp. 882, 885-88
(D.D.C. 1996).
136. See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-127, § 147, 110 Stat. 888, 919-20 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7256); see also
Announcement of Implementation of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact,
61 Fed. Reg. 44,290 (Aug. 28, 1996) (announcing the authorization and imple-
mentation of the compact by Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman).
137. See Jim Chen, The Potable Constitution, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 5
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Although I have not undertaken to measure the precise ex-
tent to which the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause
decisions have dodged congressional repudiation or even modifi-
cation,38 I do feel safe in asserting that Congress only rarely dis-
turbs the Court's staggering record of decisions in this field. In• . . .. 139
the closely related context of statutory interpretation, congres-
sional silence is treated as a less than fully desirable guide to leg-
islative intent and meaning.40 In dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine as with statutory interpretation, however, "the fact that the
dog did not bark can itself be significant."' When Congress so
conspicuously fails to revise the dormant Commerce Clause, ei-
ther in its entirety or in one of its many controversial guises, and
its failure stretches over many decades, long-standing silence as-
sumes greater interpretive significance. "In the domain of statu-
tory interpretation," Justice Stevens has observed, "Congress is
the master."' Although Congress "obviously has the power to
correct [the Court's] mistakes,... we do the country a disservice
when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence" of Congress's ac-
tual acquiescence in the dormant Commerce Clause.
43
It is implausible to attribute congressional inaction on the
dormant Commerce Clause to indifference or to structural im-
pediments to political intervention. Congress has every motive
and opportunity to address fiscal and regulatory crises faced by
the states. Very soon after the Supreme Court discarded the
(1998); cf Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from
Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 346
(1995) ("[The Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be
written in milk.").
138. I am happy to offer moral support, and perhaps even concrete assis-
tance, to any scholar who wishes to document this phenomenon in a rigorous,
thorough fashion.
139. Cf Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
617 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In the analogous setting of statutory con-
struction, we have.., refused to rely on congressional inaction to alter the
proper construction of a pre-existing statute.").
140. See generally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); James J. Brud-
ney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
141. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 589 (1982) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991); Harri-
son v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
142. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
143. See id.
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Tenth Amendment immunity doctrine of National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery1' as "unsound in principle and unworkable in prac-
tice," 45 Congress rescued states and local governments from the
fiscal burden of obeying federal minimum wage and maximumhour " 141
hour laws. Scarcely more than a year after the Supreme Court
overruled Usery, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards
Act so that state and local governments could offer their employ-
ees "flex time" in lieu of overtime pay at the rate of time-and-a-
half.147 From time to time, states are able to persuade Congress to
adopt other measures protecting their dearest fiscal and regula-
tory interests. Local governments have been exempt from certain
aspects of federal antitrust law for two decades, 14 and unfunded
mandate reform may be the last surviving element of the 104th
Congress's self-styled legal revolution.149 Statutes such as these
undermine the argument that states cannot effectively lobby
Congress on their own behalf. The Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Tenth Amendment for the past two decades has re-
quired states to "find their protection from congressional regula-
tion through the national political process, not through judicially
defined spheres of unregulable state activity."5° States and other
144. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
145. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
See generally, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National
League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1994).
146. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 578 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The financial
impact on States and localities of displacing their control over wages, hours,
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees could
have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on state and local planning, budg-
eting, and the levying of taxes."); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 203 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the application of minimum wage and
maximum hour laws to state governments could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the
States and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and education");
cf. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) ("Today the Court... impose[s] crushing and unnecessary liability on
the States, precisely at a time when they can least afford it.").
147. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99
Stat. 787; see Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 25-26 (1993).
148. See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98
Stat. 2750 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (2000)).
149. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109
Stat. 48 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1504 (2000)).
150. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988); see also Garcia, 469
U.S. at 556 ("[The States occupy a special and specific position in our constitu-
tional system .... But the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce
power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that
our system provides through state participation in federal governmental ac-
tion.").
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advocates for greater local control have routinely prevailed in this
political struggle. The fact that neither states nor their allies in
Congress have chosen, by and large, to engage the Supreme
Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions suggests a very sub-
stantial degree of legislative acquiescence.
Empirical work on reactions to Supreme Court decisions on
statutory interpretation suggests that Congress frequently does
override decisions with which it disagrees. 5' Dormant Commerce
Clause decisions are nominally constitutional in character, but in
terms of congressional recourse, they do not differ from preemp-
tion decisions. Congress has likewise demonstrated its ability and
willingness to restore much of the protection that states enjoyed
under Usery's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, again in-
spite of that doctrine's nominally constitutional character. Nearly
two centuries of congressional acquiescence on the dormant
Commerce Clause, coupled with striking evidence of Congress's
ability to respond to other decisions imposing similar restrictions
on state sovereignty, deserve a substantial measure of constitu-
tional respect.
Even Justice Scalia, no reflexive fan of stare decisis,152 has
expressed a willingness to uphold "a clear rule that honors" past
dormant Commerce Clause holdings "but declines to extend the
rationale that produced those decisions any further."5 ' In light of
the deeper institutional consensus on the dormant Commerce
Clause, this notion of stare decisis is far too miserly. The record
compiled jointly by an active Supreme Court and an acquiescent
Congress strongly suggests, at a bare minimum, that the dor-
mant Commerce Clause belongs to that class of legal propositions
for which it is more important that the "law be settled than that
it be settled right.""4 Justice Scalia has conceded that "the doc-
trine of stare decisis has 'special force' where 'Congress remains
free to alter what [the Court has] done.'" 5 ' Alexander Bickel, a
151. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
152. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Itel Containers Intl Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78-
79 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S.
266, 305-06 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
155. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 320 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
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legal giant no less vigilant than Justice Scalia in combating judi-
cial excess, conceded that the prospect of congressional override
served to legitimize the dormant Commerce Clause."6
A pragmatic defense of the dormant Commerce Clause need
not and should not rest solely on grounds of enhanced stare
decisis. (Dare I say "stare decisis with attitude"?) "Like all other
questions, the question of how to promote a flourishing society
[should] be answered as much by experience [as by] theory." '57
The Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions enjoy
the happy trait of actually working. Early in our nation's consti-
tutional history, the Court adopted a fortunate baseline favoring
free movement of goods, services, and labor among the states. As
Congress's constitutional power over interstate commerce has
expanded, judicial authority to review discriminatory or even
merely troublesome state laws has expanded in parallel fashion.
Throughout, Congress has retained the ability to reassert its own
jurisdiction over these issues, to reassign responsibility to an ex-
pert federal agency, or to relegate the matter in part or in whole
to the states themselves.'58 More often than not, however, Con-
gress has elected to leave the federal courts in charge of develop-
ing a type of constitutionally flavored federal common law on the
extent to which state and local laws may regulate or tax the na-
tional economy.
It is a standard constitutional trope to tar the Supreme
Court with the charge of "judicial activism!" whenever the Court
does something a particular critic dislikes. In truth, the Supreme
Court has handled the dormant Commerce Clause with consider-
able skill. Mindful that "Congress has the power to protect inter-
state commerce from intolerable or even undesirable burdens,"
the Court routinely acknowledges that "the better part of both
wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the other
164, 172-73 (1989)); see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,
204 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
156. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 228-31 (2d ed. 1962), cited in
Denning, supra note 9, at 398 n.61 (describing Bickel as granting "grudging ap-
proval").
157. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331, 1347 (1988).
158. Cf S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 795 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the existence of a "national agency which has been entrusted
with the task of" regulating a particular industry should counsel courts to "in-
tervene only where the state legislation discriminate[s] against interstate com-
merce or [is] out of harmony with laws which Congress ha[s] enacted").
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branches of the Government."15 9
Perhaps no other case depicts the Court's finesse as vividly
as the 1992 decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heit-
kamp.16 ° A generation earlier, the Court had held in National Bel-
las Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue16 1 that a state may not
impose sales or use taxes on a retailer who lacks a physical pres-
ence in that state. Grounding its decision in both the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant Com-
merce Clause, Bellas Hess drew a "sharp distinction... between
mail-order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within
a State, and those who do no more than communicate with cus-
tomers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a gen-
eral interstate business."16 ' This distinction conferred a de facto
exemption from state sales taxes for mail-order retailers, who
proceeded to flourish in the ensuing decades. Retailers located in
sparsely populated states with well-educated, low-wage labor
pools reaped an especially high benefit.
Over time, Bellas Hess became less politically and legally
tenable. Local retailers chafed at the tax exemption enjoyed by
out-of-state mail-order competitors, and states lamented the lost
sales and use tax revenues more than they embraced economic
growth attributable to the mail-order boom. Meanwhile, interven-
ing developments in the Supreme Court's due process jurispru-
dence made it increasingly difficult to defend the bright line
drawn in Bellas Hess. The Court held, for instance, that a state
may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
that has no physical in-state presence but purposefully avails it-
self of economic benefits in that state. 6 3 Quill accordingly over-
ruled the due process underpinnings of Bellas Hess, holding that
a mail-order retailer that "has purposefully directed its activities
at... residents" of a state thereby acquires "contacts... more
than sufficient for due process purposes" and may accordingly be
subjected to sales and use taxes in that state.6 4
Bellas Hess, however, also rested on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds, and Quill declined to disturb this aspect of the
embattled decision. "[A]lthough... cases subsequent to Bellas
159. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637-38 (1981)
(White, J., concurring).
160. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
161. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
162. Id. at 758.
163. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
164. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
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Hess and concerning other types of taxes.., have not adopted a
similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement," the Quill
Court concluded that the "reasoning in those cases does not com-
pel" a rejection of "the rule that Bellas Hess established in the
area of sales and use taxes."16' Touting instead "the continuing
value of a bright-line rule in this area" as well as "the doctrine
and principles of stare decisis," Quill announced that "the Bellas
Hess rule remains good law."66 In refusing to overrule Bellas
Hess's dormant Commerce Clause holding, the Quill Court relied
on Congress's power to override a dormant Commerce Clause re-
straint on state and local taxation:
[Tihe underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better
qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate
power to resolve. No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use
taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to dis-
agree with our conclusions. Indeed, in recent years, Congress has con-
sidered legislation that would "overrule" the Bellas Hess rule. Its de-
cision not to take action in this direction may, of course, have been
dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due Proc-
ess Clause prohibits States from imposing such taxes, but today we
have put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to
decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden in-
terstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.
167
This Solomonic resolution placed the question of state sales
and use taxation of mail-order retailing-and, eventually, elec-
tronic commerce-before Congress, undoubtedly the forum best
suited to resolving the dispute. In a situation such as the one pre-
sented by Quill, the Supreme Court is best understood as cueing
the issue for Congress and imposing a temporary restraining or-
der on sales and use taxes until Congress can address the issue.
In this sense, the dormant Commerce Clause operates as a pen-
alty default rule, reflecting Congress's usual preference but on oc-
casion imposing a penalty default that forces Congress to reveal
its real preferences when recommitment to local control would
arguably serve national interests.
Critics love to call the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce
"168Clause jurisprudence a "quagmire. I suspect that this "swamp
165. Id. at 317.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 318 (footnotes and citation omitted).
168. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 611 n.3 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Tyler Pipe Indus.,
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monster" characterization of a major branch of Supreme Court
decision making finds a ready audience in legal academia pre-
cisely because most law professors neither understand the dor-
mant Commerce Clause nor care enough about its underlying
values to spend the time needed to master the doctrine. The typi-
cal teacher of constitutional law, ironically enough, is too wealthy
to waste much thought on the value of economic integration (or at
least the devastation that would prevail in its absence). The mar-
ginal propensity to disdain the dormant Commerce Clause
probably bears a sharp and positive correlation with the degree to
which a scholar specializes in constitutional law. Oddly enough,
the bigger a scholar's professional stake in constitutional law, the
lower the likelihood that she will spend time, thought, and foot-
notes on the dormant Commerce Clause and other issues with
the greatest impact on the dollars-and-cents concerns of practic-
ing lawyers and the public at large. A poll of constitutional law
scholars would probably fail to rank the dormant Commerce
Clause and its antidiscrimination norm high among the values to
be vindicated by constitutional government. Aside from the sheer
arrogance of giving short shrift to the constitutional doctrine our
. 169
students are likeliest to encounter in practice, this attitude de-
prives many scholars of the tools to engage one of the deepest,
most reliable, and most stable bodies of Supreme Court case law.
Dormant Commerce Clause decisions no more constitute a
quagmire than decisions on, say, affirmative action, the public fo-
rum doctrine, the religion clauses, and regulatory takings. When
difficulty of its own accord becomes an excuse for judicial and in-
tellectual abdication, the Republic very well might crumble.
For those who really do wish to "secure the Blessings of Lib-
erty to ourselves and our Posterity,"170 it is fortunate that the Su-
preme Court remains at least two votes away from trashing the
dormant Commerce Clause. "IT]he 'father of the Constitution,'
James Madison," regarded "[t]he 'negative' aspect of the Com-
merce Clause" as "more important" than that provision's affirma-
tive grant of legislative power.' Justice Holmes, wounded in a
Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); cf Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of
Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (referring to "the
cloudy waters of this Court's 'dormant Commerce Clause' doctrine").
169. Yes, Michael Stokes Paulsen, I am talking to you. See generally Suz-
anna Sherry, RFRA-Vote Gambling: Why Paulsen Is Wrong, as Usual, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 27 (1997).
170. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
171. W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193 n.9; accord Camps New-
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war sparked by claims of state sovereignty run amok, understood
the importance of retaining a federal judicial check on state
power: "I do not think the United States would come to an end if
we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declara-
tion as to the laws of the several States."' 2
The truth is that the dormant Commerce Clause is not that
terribly difficult or more internally inconsistent or unpredictable
than other bodies of judge-made law. It compares quite favorably
with that other body of federal law regarding restraints of trade:
antitrust. Well before the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,
the dormant Commerce Clause served as America's original
"Magna Carta of free enterprise."73 Like its statutory counter-
part, the dormant Commerce Clause supports an evolutive,
"common law" approach that encourages courts to take account of
contextual nuance before deciding whether to uphold or condemn
a measure alleged to restrain commerce among the states.1 7 4 Of
course, though Justice Scalia might concede the existence of dual
"Magna Carta[s] of free enterprise," he would insist that neither
"give[s] judges carte blanche" to adopt whichever "approach might
yield greater competition."'75
Fair enough. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, the
Supreme Court long ago asserted the authority to review state
and local laws for their compatibility with the idealized norms of
a putatively free national marketplace. In their defense, the Jus-
tices took this power in good faith. 7 1 More important, from a
foundlOwatonna, 520 U.S. at 571 n.7.
172. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920).
173. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also
Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 n.19 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 651 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc.
v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 n.38 (1983); Cmty. Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 57 n.19 (1982); Cal. Retail Liq-
uor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980); City of La-
fayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 n.16 (1978); Vendo Co. v.
Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 666 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 291 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997); Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454 (1993); Daniel A. Farber & Brett H.
McDonnell, "Is There a Text in This Class?": The Conflict Between Textualism
and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 2004).
175. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S.
Ct. 872, 883 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
176. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U.
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pragmatic perspective, they have done a good job. Despite nu-
merous opportunities over the course of centuries to undo this
state of affairs, Congress has retained the courts' presumptive
power to review state and local regulation and taxation of the na-
tional economy. That mountain of acquiescence is neither ratifi-
cation in an Article V sense nor a "constitutional moment" of the
sort Bruce Ackerman has advocated.'7 7 But it will do. Congres-
sional inaction has ratified the dormant Commerce Clause "in a
substantial if informal sense."78
IV. PRAGMATISM UNMODIFIED
The Supreme Court exerts and will continue to exert "perva-
sive influence on a wide range of issues that can only in a partial
and peripheral way be considered legal rather than political.'7 9
One of the most important bodies of constitutional law fitting this
description is the dormant Commerce Clause. If the deepest criti-
cism of the dormant Commerce Clause is that its absence of firm
textual support in the Constitution renders this an unusually po-
litical and therefore presumptively improper "policy-laden" body
of decisions,8 ° defenders of this doctrine can afford to concede the
point. Constitutional law by its very nature includes vast bodies
ofjudicial decision making that bear at most tenuous connections
to the text, structure, and original intent of the Constitution. I
leave to another time, though not necessarily another scholar, the
challenge of crafting a more comprehensive answer to the deep
conundrum of original meaning in constitutional law. Why
should the Framers' understanding of the Constitution be privi-
leged over later interpretations designed to ensure that the "ideas
and aspirations" embodied in that document actually "survive
more ages than one"?' 8 ' Why indeed does constitutional law frit-
L.Q. 1085 (1995).
177. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991).
178. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7
(1983). My use of this phrase from White, which I consider to be one of the most
atrociously protectionistic cases in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, is
opportunistic and cynical.
179. Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858,
860 (1990).
180. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
620 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992); cf U.S.
CONST. pmbl. (describing the Constitution as having been adopted "in Order
to .. . secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity");
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ter away its best intellectual resources on the bootless search for
original meaning, when every other field of human enterprise
understands that a "science which hesitates to forget its founders
is lost"?'82 For now it suffices to endorse Justice Holmes's defini-
tion of law as "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious."83
Left unfettered, state and local laws crippling the greater
economy "would... invite a speedy end of our national solidar-
ity.",' 4 Our Constitution arose under "the theory that the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not divi-
sion."185 Vindication of this ideal, though theoretically within the
reach of Congress, in practice demands meaningful judicial re-
view. To Justice Scalia's great chagrin, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have extracted--'by a sort of intellectual adverse posses-
sion" of the third clause in Article I, Section 8-a judicial power
to review state laws from what is nominally a simple grant of
legislative authority.1 86 In filling in one of the "great silences of
the Constitution,"87 the dormant Commerce Clause also satisfies
one of the Republic's great needs. Aided (but not supplanted) by
the Import-Export Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, the shamelessly judicial formulas that
comprise dormant Commerce Clause doctrine continue to uphold
the core federal interest in a nationwide common market. But
Article I as a whole is cluttered with provisions urging Congress
to legislate in favor of commerce and private enterprise. The
Constitution's recitation of federal legislative powers anticipates
that Congress would tax, borrow, harmonize bankruptcies, coin
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) ("This provision is
made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.").
182. A.N. WHITEHEAD, The Organisation of Thought, in THE AIMS OF
EDUCATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 153, 162 (1929); cf EDWARD 0. WILSON,
CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 182-83 (1998) ("[Plrogress in a scien-
tific discipline can be measured by how quickly its founders are forgotten.").
183. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 994 (1997).
184. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
185. Id.
186. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949); accord
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 611 n.3
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1796 [Vol 88:1764
VISION SOFTLY CREEPING
money, standardize weights and measures, combat counterfeit-
ing, establish a postal system, and create intellectual property in
addition to regulating foreign, interstate, and Indian commerce.
In light of the prominence of the Commerce Clause within Article
I, one truly must ask why we need "a textual hook for what, in
essence, is a structural principle-that the union created by the
Constitution sought to protect interstate commerce from protec-
tionist regulation by states."'18
The sitting judicial opponents of the dormant Commerce
Clause accept none of this, and we have every reason to expect
that they never will. According to Justice Scalia, "'Congress' si-
lence is just that-silence.'"8 9 He leaves himself open to a tit-for-
tautology retort: "comments in [Justice Scalia's] dissenting opin-
ion [s] ... are just that: comments in [his] dissenting opinion [si."'90
Meanwhile, critics more open to persuasion might seek stronger
reassurance that the dormant Commerce Clause remains moored
to the usual sources of constitutional restraint. Professor
Denning wisely endorses Donald Regan's observation that consti-
tutional scholars, no less than "nature abhors a vacuum," instinc-
tively "abhor constitutional principles without a specific textual
grounding."'9 ' Calvin Johnson has attempted to extract a surro-
gate for constitutional text from judicial practices that prevailed
during the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution of 1787.192 Economic and process-based defenses of
the dormant Commerce Clause do exist, even if they remain a
distinct minority within legal scholarship, and serious students of
this subject should anticipate Professor Denning's next contribu-
tion to this literature with great relish. Still, the fact remains
that constitutional silence will always be the great flaw in the
dormant Commerce Clause. Silence of a different sort-
congressional silence-represents the most promising cure.
The dormant Commerce Clause suffers from constitutional
silence. It always has; till a fifth vote on the Supreme Court or a
188. Denning, supra note 9, at 413-14.
189. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 262 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987)).
190. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980).
191. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865, 1889 (1987), quoted and cited in Denning,
supra note 9, at 414 & n.138.
192. See Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from
the Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, 21 CONST. COMMENT. (forth-
coming 2004).
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majority in both houses of Congress repeals the doctrine, it al-
ways will. This is hardly unique to the dormant Commerce
Clause-or cause for constitutional alarm. Among the doctrine's
critics, Justices Scalia and Thomas are probably the likeliest to
compare the dormant Commerce Clause, and derisively at that,
to other constitutional doctrines derived from the "penumbras"
and "emanations" of the Constitution.9  These critics overlook a
crucial trait of constitutional adjudication. Penumbras and ema-
nations are precisely the parts of the Constitution that "help
give... life and substance" to constitutional doctrine.194 Socially
progressive jurists and commentators laud what can only be
called "Penumbra Left" in American constitutional law: the juris-
prudential arc of substantive due process from Skinner v. Okla-
homa 95 to Lawrence v. Texas.96 For its part, a right-of-center five-
Justice coalition within today's Supreme Court has extendedT • • 197
Hans v. Louisiana, itself a decision crafted strictly from the
wordless shadows of the Eleventh Amendment, into a "dramatic
expansion of the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity"
that is "unpredictable" and driven solely "by the present major-
ity's perception of constitutional penumbras rather than constitu-
tional text."'98 That project richly deserves the name of "Penum-
bra Right."
Well, so what? "[W]hen the Court changes its mind, the law
changes with it."199 As Professor Denning has said, pragmatic
constitutional adjudication is comfortably penumbral.2 °° So am I.
Constitutional silence is the usual state of affairs. The quieter
193. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
194. Id.
195. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
196. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
197. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
198. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 665 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 713 (1999) (admitting that "the sovereign immunity of the States neither
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment"). Com-
pare Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996) ("Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control."), with id. at
116 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing "plain text" as "the Man of Steel in a
confrontation" with mere background postulates). See generally Jed Rubenfeld,
The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289 (2001).
199. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); accord Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,
115 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
200. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Pen-
umbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089(1997).
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and more mysterious the Constitution is, the greater the levels of
judicial creativity and volatility.
Congressional silence, on the other hand, bears close notice.
Indefinite congressional acquiescence is the closest thing we have
to de facto ratification of the dormant Commerce Clause, and
honest constitutional scholars owe a responsibility to say so. In
controversies that more overtly involve the separation of powers
within the federal government, ratification by silence routinely
works. The judicial "construction and [legall effect of [a] constitu-
tional provision," especially one affecting the allocation of powers
among the branches of the federal government, may be "con-
firmed by the practical construction that has been given to it by
the Presidents"-or, as I argue here, by the Supreme Court-
"through a long course of years, in which Congress has acqui-
esced."2°' More generally, "[1]ong settled and established practice
is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of
constitutional provisions. " "'
In one of his earliest Supreme Court cases, Justice Scalia in-
advertently summarized the essence not only of separation of
powers jurisprudence, but also of lawmaking at the highest court
in the land: "This is what this [Court] is about. Power.""3 Three
years later, Justice Thurgood Marshall registered an almost
identical lament from a jurisprudentially divergent perspective:
"Power, not reason, is the... currency of this Court's decision-
making."20 4 Neither of these Justices, alas, understood the true
significance of an older colleague's five-finger salute. When Jus-
tice Brennan flashed five fingers to his clerks, he was not signify-
ing so much a "rule of five"-the unexceptional strategic rule of
thumb that it takes five votes to achieve anything at the Supreme
Court-as he was announcing "rule by five--a more useful re-
minder that five votes enable a Justice to do anything.2 5
In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, "rule by
five" amplifies the sound of congressional silence into an unmis-
takable clarion call. For critics of the dormant Commerce Clause,
Congress's "[s]ilence like a cancer grows."20 6 "Although Congress
201. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 688-89 (1929).
202. Id. at 689.
203. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205. Cf Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 748, 763 (1995).
206. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on SOUNDS OF SILENCE
(Columbia 1966).
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unquestionably has the power to repudiate or substantially mod-
ify [the dormant Commerce Clause's] course of adjudication, it
has not done so.""' Anything shy of complete denunciation by
Congress will further entrench the prevailing judicial practice of
reviewing state and local laws for compatibility with a nation-
wide common market.
The two most celebrated separation of powers controversies
in Supreme Court history confirm how congressional acquies-
cence has effectively ratified the dormant Commerce Clause. To
paraphrase Justice Jackson in the more recent and somewhat
less famous of these cases:
If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to
Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them." We
may say that power to [review state laws] belongs in the hands of
Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers.08
As for the most famous separation of powers case of them all, a
modest modification of Chief Justice Marshall's most strident
slogan should represent the final word regarding the legitimacy
and wisdom of the dormant Commerce Clause:
It is emphatically the duty and province of the legislative department
to say what the law is.2 9
207. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
572 (1997) (footnote omitted).
208. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
209. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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